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 Fulton Bank (the “Bank”) appeals from a grant of 
summary judgment by the district court in favor of appellee 
Jeffrey Ream on April 1, 1996.  Ream brought suit against the 
Bank alleging that it breached its fiduciary duty by resigning as 
plan trustee and transferring to Jeffrey Frey, the plan 
administrator and the principal in Ream's employer, the assets of 
an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 
pension fund plan which Frey subsequently converted and used for 
his own purposes.  This appeal raises questions concerning the 
scope of the fiduciary duties of a plan trustee under ERISA when 
the trustee is resigning.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 as this appeal is from a final order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
This case arises under ERISA, and thus the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
ERISA § 502(e)(1) and (f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and (f).   
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The material facts are not in dispute.  See 
Supplemental Appendix, Stipulation of Uncontested Facts 
(“Stipulated Facts”).  Ream was an employee of JLC Construction 
Co., Inc. (“Company”).  Stipulated Fact ¶ 3.  Effective January 
1, 1989, the Company established the JLC Construction Company 
Profit Sharing 401(k) Plan (the “plan”) under 26 U.S.C. § 401 et 
seq.  The Company first established the plan pursuant to written 
plan documents consisting of a Standardized Adoption Agreement 
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and Basic Plan Document.1  Stipulated Fact ¶ 4.  Ream was a 
participant in the plan with a 100% vested account.  Stipulated 
Fact ¶ 3.  Fulton Bank, the designated plan trustee, deposited 
all of the plan's funds in a trust account it maintained at the 
Bank.     
 In addition to designating Fulton Bank as plan trustee, 
the Basic Plan Document designated the Company as the plan 
administrator, and the Adoption Agreement designated Frey, the 
sole shareholder of the Company, as the plan administrator on 
behalf of the Company.  App. at 62-63.  The Plan Document also 
specified the responsibilities of the administrator and the 
trustee.  The administrator had the duties of establishing a 
funding policy consistent with ERISA, determining and making 
contributions to the plan, communicating with plan beneficiaries 
and participants, and complying with ERISA and other governmental 
reporting requirements.  Basic Plan Document § 11.1.  The 
trustee's duties were limited to receiving contributions, 
investing the contributions once received, and making 
distributions in accordance with instructions from the Company.  
Basic Plan Document § 11.2.  However, the Basic Plan Document 
placed the responsibility solely on the Company to collect and 
remit the contributions to the trustee.  Basic Plan Document § 
3.3.  Further, the plan specifically allocated to the Company, as 
                     
1.     Fulton Bank, which also serves as plan trustee for other 
pension plans and charges a fee for its services, provided all 
plan documents to the Company.  Stipulated Fact ¶ 7. 
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the plan administrator, all other administrative duties required 
by either applicable law or by the plan.   
 The Plan Document specifically limited the liability of 
the trustee.  Section 11.4 of the Plan Document, entitled 
“Division of Duties and Indemnification,” exempted the trustee 
from any guarantee “against investment loss or depreciation in 
asset value, or [from any] guarantee [about] the adequacy of the 
Fund to meet and discharge all or any liabilities of the Plan.”  
However, the trustee could be liable for its actions “to the 
extent it is judicially determined that the Trustee/Custodian has 
failed to exercise the care, skill, prudence and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in 
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like aims.”  
Furthermore, Section 11.4 stated that “[t]he duties and 
obligations of the Trustee/Custodian shall be limited to those 
expressly imposed upon it by this instrument or subsequently 
agreed upon by the parties.  Responsibility for administrative 
duties required under the Plan or applicable law not expressly 
imposed upon or agreed to by the Trustee/Custodian, shall rest 
solely with the Employer.” 
 During Fulton Bank's tenure as trustee, the Company 
sometimes would delay its remittance of employer contributions 
for several months.  Fulton Bank then would call or write to the 
Company to expedite remittance of the contributions.  The Company 
caused the Bank additional difficulties because it was 
uncooperative in providing the Bank with information regarding 
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the plan's administration.  Stipulated Fact ¶ 17.  By the spring 
of 1993, the Company had failed to provide Fulton Bank with 
employer matching contributions for 1992 and 1993.  The Bank sent 
the Company letters “admonishing” it to pay over the monies and 
warning that it would resign as trustee if salary deferral 
remittances continued to be delinquent.  Finally, the Bank 
forwarded a letter to Frey stating that it was resigning as 
trustee pursuant to its prior correspondence and pursuant to 
Article 15.6 of the Basic Plan Document.  See app. at 284, 
Exhibit 6, app. at 286, Exhibit 7.  Article 15.6 provides that 
the trustee may resign by written notice to the Company followed 
by delivery of the fund assets to the Company's chosen successor 
trustee.  If the Company failed to appoint a successor, the Bank 
could deliver the assets to the Company which then would be 
deemed the successor trustee.   
 The Bank then attempted to contact the Company to 
persuade it to appoint a successor trustee for the plan assets, 
but Frey never responded to the Bank's repeated requests for an 
appointment.  Stipulated Fact ¶ 23.  Thus, a successor trustee 
never was appointed.  Ultimately, the Bank sent a letter to Frey 
stating that unless Frey notified Fulton Bank of the successor 
within 15 days, the Bank would issue a check to Frey and 
designate him as the successor trustee in accordance with the 
plan.  App. at 291.  Frey did not respond, and Fulton Bank sent 
him a letter on October 5, 1993, informing him of the status of 
the plan and forwarding the plan assets consisting of a check in 
the amount of $53,008.15 and three promissory notes.  App. at 
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293.  The Bank appointed Frey as the successor trustee of the 
plan.  The check was payable to “Jeffrey Frey, successor Trustee 
for the JLC Construction Co., Inc. Profit Sharing 401(k) plan.”  
The check was endorsed “Jeffrey Frey” and honored by the Bank.  
Frey subsequently converted all of the assets of the plan to his 
own use. 
 Ream's account balance in the plan at the end of 1992 
was $13,829.92, and he continued to make weekly contributions to 
the plan through 1993 totaling $1,180.80.  As we indicated, the 
Bank sent Frey a check for $53,008.15, an amount exceeding Ream's 
balance.  At oral argument counsel advised us that there were ten 
to fifteen of other beneficiaries to the plan, but except for 
Ream no beneficiary has brought any action against the Bank. 
 On November 3, 1994, the Company filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and shortly thereafter Ream demanded payment of his 
plan assets from Frey.  Until this time, Ream was not aware that 
Fulton Bank had transferred the plan assets to Frey, and neither 
the Bank nor the Company ever had notified Ream of the delays in 
payments to the plan, of Fulton Bank's intention to resign, or of 
Fulton Bank's final resignation.  Ream's wife contacted Fulton 
Bank after the Company filed for bankruptcy.  In response to her 
inquiry as to why the trustee had not notified the plan 
beneficiaries as to what had happened, the Bank responded that 
“while we are not having cooperation from the Company, that did 
not mean bad things were happening . . . .”  App. at 347.   
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 By letter dated January 4, 1995, Frey acknowledged that 
he owed Ream $16,206.00 pursuant to the plan and proposed paying 
that money in installments.  App. at 346; Stipulated Fact ¶ 34.  
Though Ream initially rejected this offer, instead instituting 
suit against both Frey and the Bank for breach of fiduciary duty, 
Ream later agreed to settle with Frey for $21,556.93.  However, 
Frey paid only $18,556.93 to Ream before disappearing.  It 
appears that the settlement figure exceeded the amount due Ream 
under the plan because Frey owed him additional money on other 
items.  App. at 306. 
 This appeal concerns the $3,000.00 which Frey did not 
pay to Ream plus interest owed to Ream as well as the substantial 
attorney's fees that Ream has incurred.  Frey has been dismissed 
from the suit as he is no longer within the jurisdiction and the 
parties do not know his whereabouts.  Stipulated Fact ¶ 36. 
 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court held that Ream could recover damages on his own behalf for 
a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, that Fulton Bank violated 
its fiduciary duty by not acting as a prudent person when it 
forwarded the plan assets to Frey who had a history of failing in 
his fiduciary duties to the plan, and that Fulton Bank was liable 
for Frey's subsequent breach of fiduciary duties because its own 
failure to comply with the required standard of care enabled 
Frey, a co-fiduciary, to convert the assets of the plan for his 
own use.
2
  The court, however, dismissed Ream's common law tort 
                     
2.  We need not reach the question of whether Fulton Bank is 
liable as a co-fiduciary under ERISA § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
1105(a), inasmuch as we will affirm the district court judgment 
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claims as preempted by ERISA - a holding he does not dispute on 
this appeal.  Although it had reserved the issue of damages for 
trial, based on the parties' stipulated agreement the court 
entered a judgment against the Bank on April 15, 1996, in the 
amount of $3,200.00 and awarded Ream $18,000.00 in attorney's 
fees and costs.3  Fulton Bank then appealed.  We are undertaking 
a plenary review of the district court's decision. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 A “person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan,” and 
therefore subject to ERISA fiduciary duties, “to the extent” that 
“he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management” of the plan, or “has any 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration” of the plan.  ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A).  Fulton Bank was the trustee of the plan.  As 
described in the Plan Document, “the Trustee/Custodian shall have 
the authority and discretion to manage and govern the Fund to the 
extent provided in this instrument.”  App. at 250.  Clearly, this 
provision evidences an express allocation of discretionary 
authority to Fulton Bank as trustee.  Further, the Plan Document 
                                                                  
on the basis that the Bank violated its fiduciary duties as 
trustee and the damages are the same whether the Bank is found 
liable as trustee or as co-fiduciary. 
3.     We note that Frey paid Ream all but $3,000.00 of the 
settlement but Ream and the Bank stipulated his damages at 
$3,200.00.  We cannot explain this discrepancy.  The Bank does 
not challenge the amount of the attorney's fees and costs the 
court awarded. 
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holds the trustee liable only to the extent that “it is 
judicially determined that the Trustee/Custodian has failed to 
exercise the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a 
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like aims."  
Id.  These words are the very ones used in ERISA to describe 
fiduciary duties.  ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(B).  There is thus no question but that under the 
plan, Fulton Bank was intended to be and was a fiduciary with all 
of its corresponding duties and responsibilities and, indeed, it 
does not contend otherwise. 
 
a. Recovery as an Individual Beneficiary 
 Fulton Bank argues that the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139, 
105 S.Ct. 3085, 3089 (1985), an action under ERISA § 502(a)(2), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), precluded an ERISA beneficiary from 
recovering damages on his own behalf from an ERISA fiduciary for 
breaches of fiduciary duty.  Thus, the Bank contends "that 
remedies for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA must 
enure to the benefit of the entire [p]lan or to all plan 
participants."  Br. at 19.  Accordingly, in its view Ream cannot 
maintain this action as he is seeking relief for himself.  In a 
sense, of course, this may be a strange argument for the Bank to 
make.  Ream unquestionably does have standing to bring an action 
on behalf of the plan, and it is entirely possible that such an 
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action would have resulted in a greater judgment against the Bank 
than the judgment Ream recovered as the Bank sent Frey all of the 
plan's assets, not just those reflecting Ream's interest.  ERISA 
§ 502(a)(2).   
 In any event, as Ream points out, the Supreme Court in 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996), held that in some 
circumstances beneficiaries could make personal recoveries from 
an ERISA fiduciary for breach of fiduciary obligations.  In 
Varity, the Court agreed with our decision in Bixler v. Central 
Pennsylvania Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d 
Cir. 1993), that ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), 
authorizes lawsuits for individualized equitable relief for 
breach of fiduciary obligations.4  As the Court explained in 
Varity, “one can read § 409 [29 U.S.C. § 1109] [which establishes 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty] as reflecting a special 
congressional concern about plan asset management without also 
finding that Congress intended that section to contain the 
exclusive set of remedies for every kind of fiduciary breach.”  
                     
4.      In Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health-
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d at 1298, we upheld the right of an 
individual beneficiary to recover from a fiduciary, pointing to 
the narrowness of the Supreme Court's holding in Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085.  We stressed ERISA's grounding in the 
law of trusts, and reiterated that “fundamental in the law of 
trusts is the principle that ‘courts will give to beneficiaries 
of a trust the remedies necessary for the protection of their 
interests.’”  12 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 157, 
105 S.Ct. at 3098) (concurring opinion)).  In permitting a 
beneficiary to bring a direct action for breach of fiduciary duty 
against the trustees and administrators of an ERISA plan, we 
concluded that “[a]llowing an injured beneficiary recourse 
through the courts is, furthermore, essential to fulfilling the 
purpose of ERISA.”  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1299. 
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Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 1077.  The Court found this reading 
“consistent with [ERISA] § 502's overall structure” which 
provides two “catchalls” which “act as a safety net, offering 
appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations 
that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.”  Id. at 1077-
78.  The Supreme Court did caution, however, that in fashioning 
“appropriate” equitable relief, courts should “keep in mind the 
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans, and . . . 
respect the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain 
remedies and the exclusion of others.” Id. at 1079 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Where Congress otherwise has 
provided for appropriate relief for the injury suffered by a 
beneficiary, further equitable relief ought not be provided.   
 The Court in Varity distinguished Russell, explaining 
that Russell was confined to suits under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and 
did not limit the relief available under ERISA § 502(a)(3) which 
permits “appropriate equitable relief” to “redress any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this title.”  Varity, 
116 S.Ct. at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ream, like 
the plaintiffs in Varity, has no alternative means of recovering 
for his losses.  In Varity, the plaintiffs were no longer members 
of the plan and therefore had no “benefits due [them] under the 
terms of [the] plan."  Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 1079; see also ERISA 
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  Nor could they 
proceed under ERISA § 502(a)(2) because that provision does not 
allow for individual recovery.  See Russell, 473 U.S. at 144, 105 
S.Ct. at 3091.  Thus, to recover the plaintiffs in Varity had to 
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rely on ERISA § 502(a)(3) which provides for “other appropriate 
equitable relief,” a reliance the Court found justified as there 
was no ERISA-related purpose for denying a remedy.   
 Ream is in a position similar to that of the plaintiffs 
in Varity and he, too, should have a remedy under ERISA § 
502(a)(3).  He suffered a direct, clearly defined personal loss 
from the Bank's conduct.  Furthermore, this is not a case in 
which an individual plan beneficiary charges a fiduciary with a 
breach of fiduciary duties with respect to a functioning plan.  
In that situation it might be inappropriate to permit a 
beneficiary to seek personal relief as a recovery by the plan 
effectively would make the beneficiary whole.  We emphasize, 
therefore, that a court must apply ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) 
cautiously when an individual plan beneficiary seeks "appropriate 
equitable relief."5  Such caution would be consistent with the 
concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Varity about a court 
being too expansive in granting relief.  Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 
1079. 
                     
5.     “Appropriate equitable relief” generally is limited to 
traditional equitable relief such as restitution and injunctions 
rather than money damages.  Hein v. FDIC, 88 F.3d 210, 223-24 & 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not 
“necessarily bar all forms of money damages.”  Id. at 224, n.11. 
 Here, though the district court seemed to treat Ream's complaint 
as one seeking money damages, Ream sought only to recover his 
vested interest in the plan which largely reflected his own 
contributions.  See app. at 298.  This relief, regardless of the 
language in the complaint, easily may be characterized as 
restitution and the Bank does not contend otherwise.  See Howe v. 
Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 116 S.Ct. 
1065 (1996).   
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 The legislative history of ERISA supports our view that 
the personal recovery Ream obtained constituted “appropriate 
equitable relief.”   
[ERISA] imposes strict fiduciary obligations on those 
who have discretion or responsibility respecting the 
management, handling or disposition of pension or 
welfare plan assets.  The objectives of these 
provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts; to 
prohibit exculpatory clauses that have often been used 
in this field; to establish uniform fiduciary standards 
to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger 
plan assets; and to provide effective remedies for 
breaches of trust. 
 
120 Cong. Rec. 15737 (1974) (Comments of Sen. Williams when 
introducing the Conference Report), reprinted in (1974) 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186.  This excerpt evidences Congress' 
intention to impose on ERISA fiduciaries a strict code of conduct 
to protect adequately pension and welfare plan assets.  Allowing 
an ERISA trustee to escape liability after disregarding the 
interests of plan beneficiaries would undermine Congress' intent. 
 Thus, this case falls squarely within the category of cases the 
Supreme Court envisioned as necessitating a broad reading of 
ERISA § 502(a)(3).  The district court was correct in allowing 
Ream, an ERISA beneficiary, to bring an action seeking individual 
relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) against Fulton Bank, an ERISA 
fiduciary, for breach of its fiduciary duties. 
 
b. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
 The district court was also correct in finding that in 
the circumstances of this case Fulton Bank breached its fiduciary 
duties.  Ream claims that the Bank breached these duties in three 
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distinct ways:  (1) by transferring the plan funds to Frey with 
knowledge that: (a) the Company was failing; (b) the Company had 
failed to make contributions for the two prior years; and (c) 
Frey was neglecting his duties as plan administrator by failing 
to communicate with the Bank or even to respond to its 
correspondence; (2) by resigning as trustee without notifying the 
beneficiaries that the Company was severely delinquent in making 
employer contributions; and (3) by failing to notify the 
beneficiaries that it had resigned as trustee and forwarded the 
plan assets to Frey.  The district court held that Fulton Bank 
breached its fiduciary duties because, aware that Frey was 
failing in his fiduciary duties, it nevertheless sent the plan 
assets to him.  In support of its finding, the district court 
pointed to Frey's lack of cooperation in providing the Bank with 
information necessary for the administration of the plan, to the 
Company's consistent tardiness in paying and failure to pay both 
employee and employer contributions, and to Frey's failure to 
respond to the Bank's repeated attempts to have Frey appoint a 
successor trustee and to remit loan payments.   
 As a fiduciary, Fulton Bank had the duty to perform its 
functions solely in the interest of the beneficiaries of the plan 
and “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct 
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”  ERISA 
§ 404(a)(1)(B).  A fiduciary's duties under ERISA are based both 
on ERISA, particularly the prudent person standard as set forth 
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in ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104, and on the common law of 
trusts.  “Congress intended by § 404(a) to incorporate the 
fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA, and it is black-
letter trust law that fiduciaries owe strict duties running 
directly to beneficiaries in the administration and payment of 
trust benefits.”  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Russell, 473 
U.S. at 152-53, 105 S.Ct. at 3095-96) (concurring opinion)).   
 The law of trusts, however, serves as no more than a 
guide for interpreting ERISA's provisions.  “In some instances, 
trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts 
must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the 
statute, its structure, or its purpose require departing from 
common-law trust requirements.”  Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 1070.  This 
process is necessary because ERISA's standards and procedural 
protections partly reflect a congressional determination “that 
the common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory 
protection.”  Id.  Congress passed ERISA, in part, to address the 
problem of exculpatory clauses in trust documents.  See 120 Cong. 
Rec. 15737 (1974) (Comments of Sen. Williams when introducing the 
Conference Report), reprinted in (1974) U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186. 
 Nevertheless, we have stated clearly that an ERISA fiduciary's 
duties do include the common law duties of trustees: 
Acknowledging, as we do today, that ERISA's fiduciary 
duty section incorporates the common law of trusts, the 
appellate court found the duty to disclose material 
information 'is the core of a fiduciary's 
responsibility.' [Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 
F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)].  As set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, '[The Trustee] is under 
a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts 
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he 
knows the beneficiary does not know and which the 
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beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing 
with a third person.'  Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
Section 173, comment d (1959).  This duty to inform is 
a constant thread in the relationship between 
beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only a negative 
duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to 
inform when the trustee knows that silence might be 
harmful. 
 
Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300.6 
 Under traditional trust law, a trustee is permitted to 
resign in accordance with the terms of the trust, with the 
consent of the beneficiaries, or with a court's permission.  See 
Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. 
Newbridge Secs., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1183-84 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Restatement of the Law (Second) Trusts § 106.  Most of the 
relevant case law, which involves trustees failing to comply with 
these requirements, suggests that a trustee may be liable for a 
breach of fiduciary duty for resigning without providing for a 
“suitable and trustworthy replacement.”  Friend v. Sanwa Bank 
California, 35 F.3d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 1994) (concurring 
opinion).  See Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1183 ("Courts that have 
considered the issue have held that an ERISA fiduciary's 
obligations to a plan are extinguished only when adequate 
provision has been made for the continued prudent management of 
plan assets."). 
                     
6.     But we emphasize that the Supreme Court has recognized 
that trust law does not control completely in the ERISA setting. 
 Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 1070.  Consequently, the Court has 
indicated that courts must create federal common law to flesh out 
the meaning of ERISA and effectuate fully its meaning and 
purpose. 
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 Here, there was no provision in the plan requiring the 
trustee to notify plan participants of the Company's failure to 
make contributions or of the trustee's intention to resign.  But 
allowing a fiduciary to resign without notice to the plan 
beneficiaries in a situation in which the fiduciary has 
information indicating that the beneficiaries may need protection 
because of the change of trustee would undermine the goals of 
ERISA.  Thus, even if Fulton Bank's resignation complied with the 
terms of the plan, it would be overly formalistic (and contrary 
to the explicit statutory directives in ERISA) to hold that the 
Bank's resignation in the circumstances here necessarily was 
acceptable behavior for a fiduciary.    
 Thus, Ream is correct in asserting that:  “[a] 
fiduciary must satisfy ERISA's fiduciary standard of care, in 
addition to whatever contractual duties may be set forth in the 
plan documentation.”  Br. at 20.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized expressly this broad duty of an ERISA fiduciary: 
There is more to plan (or trust) administration than 
simply complying with the specific duties imposed by 
the plan documents or statutory regime; it also 
includes the activities that are 'ordinary and natural 
means' of achieving the 'objective' of the plan. 
[Citation omitted.]  Indeed, the primary function of 
the fiduciary duty is to constrain the exercise of 
discretionary powers which are controlled by no other 
specific duty imposed by the trust instrument or the 
legal regime.  If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing 
more than activities already controlled by other legal 
duties, it would serve no purpose. 
 
Varity, 116 S.Ct. at 1073-74.   
 We need not decide today whether Fulton Bank could be 
liable merely because it did not notify the beneficiaries of the 
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plan that the Company was delinquent in failing to make 
contributions.  The issue of whether the Bank could be liable for 
that omission in itself is not before us as there are other, 
distinct factors supporting the district court's judgment holding 
the Bank liable.  Furthermore, Ream's loss is not attributable to 
the Company's failure to make contributions.  Moreover, we 
recognize that it might be unreasonably burdensome on a trustee 
to give notification to a large number of beneficiaries of every 
apparent shortcoming of an employer.  We also realize that, while 
we have held that in some circumstances a fiduciary can be liable 
for failing to notify beneficiaries that an employer is not 
making required contributions to a plan, Rosen v. Hotel and 
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 600 (3d 
Cir. 1981), a rule requiring in all cases that a fiduciary notify 
the beneficiaries when an employer is delinquent in contributions 
seems to be inappropriate.  After all, the delinquency might be 
nothing more than a quickly remedied clerical oversight.  As we 
pointed out with respect to an analogous situation in Glaziers: 
 We do not, of course, hold that one who may 
have attained a fiduciary status thereby has 
an obligation to disclose all details of its 
personnel decisions that may somehow impact 
upon the course of dealings with a 
beneficiary/client.  Rather, a fiduciary has 
a legal duty to disclose to the beneficiary 
only those material facts known to the 
fiduciary but unknown to the beneficiary, 
which the beneficiary must know for its own 
protection. 
 
Glaziers, 93 F.3d at 1182.   
 Glaziers, though clearly distinguishable on the facts, 
nevertheless has a certain similarity to this case and is useful 
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as a precedent to us.  In Glaziers an employee of a brokerage 
firm left the firm in circumstances of which the firm was aware 
and which suggested that he was dishonest.  Prior to leaving the 
firm's employ, the employee acted as the firm's representative to 
the plaintiff employee benefits funds.  When the employee left 
the firm's employ, the firm assigned a new executive to the 
plaintiffs' accounts but did not inform the plaintiffs of the 
circumstances surrounding the employee's departure.  
Subsequently, at the plaintiffs' request, the firm transferred 
the plaintiffs' funds through an intermediary to a new firm that 
the departed employee had established, again without advising the 
plaintiffs of the negative information regarding its former 
employee.  The employee then wasted and stole the plaintiffs' 
assets.  The plaintiffs sued the brokerage firm alleging, inter 
alia, breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  The district court 
granted summary judgment to the brokerage firm holding that if it 
was a fiduciary it was only with respect to investment advice.  
Thus the court concluded that the firm could not be liable as its 
breaches of duty were unrelated to investment advice.   
 We reversed and remanded the case for the district 
court to determine whether, in fact, the brokerage firm was a 
fiduciary.  In our opinion we discussed the scope of fiduciary 
duties.  We pointed out that "[u]nder the common law of trusts, a 
fiduciary has a fundamental duty to furnish information to a 
beneficiary."  Id. at 1180.  We criticized the brokerage firm 
because it "sat silently by knowing that the [plaintiffs] were 
placing their assets under" the departed employee's control.  Id. 
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at 1181.  We cited with approval Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
173, comment (d) (1959), that a fiduciary can have an affirmative 
obligation to disclose material facts to a beneficiary which the 
beneficiary does not know but needs to know for his protection in 
dealing with a third person.  Id. at 1181.  We summed up by 
holding that if on the remand the fact-finder determined that the 
firm was an ERISA fiduciary it "had a duty to disclose to the 
[plaintiffs] any material information which it knew, and which 
the [plaintiffs] did not know, but needed to know for [their] 
protection."  Id. at 1182.  See also Barker v. American Mobile 
Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 Here, Fulton Bank made no effort to ensure the 
continued viability of the plan after its resignation.  The Bank 
knew that the Company was having financial difficulties and that 
it owed significant monies to the plan.  In a file memorandum 
dated May 6, 1992, Geoffrey Platt, the Bank's Employee Benefit 
Administrator, noted that the Company's controller told him that 
the Company was "currently experiencing a severe cash flow 
problem."  Platt also pointed out that Frey was late making his 
own loan payments.  Thus, Platt recommended that the Bank discuss 
resigning because of the Company's delay in remitting 
contributions and its “prior history of slow remittance, and an 
obvious cash flow problem.”  App. at 283.    
 This knowledge of the Company's problems in conjunction 
with Frey's failure to respond to the Bank's numerous attempts to 
communicate about the future administration of the plan should 
have led the Bank as a reasonably prudent trustee to recognize 
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that turning over the assets to Frey posed a real threat to the 
plan assets.  While the Bank suggests in its brief that it would 
have had to have been clairvoyant to anticipate that Frey would 
convert the funds, we think that ordinary common sense should 
have warned it of this possibility.  Indeed, we cannot help but 
wonder whether, when it turned over the plan's assets to Frey, 
the Bank would have entrusted him with its own money. 
 Overall, we think it is clear that the Bank failed to 
act prudently in sending the plan assets to Frey and neglecting 
to inform plan beneficiaries of the circumstances -- even when 
the wife of one beneficiary called and asked specifically about 
the situation.  While we do not hold that the Bank was required 
to remain as plan trustee, we do hold that it could not appoint 
Frey as the successor trustee and turn over the assets to him, at 
least without giving the plan beneficiaries reasonable advance 
notice that it intended to take these steps and advising the 
beneficiaries of why it was resigning.  If it had given that 
notice, the beneficiaries would have had the opportunity to take 
steps to protect the plan assets.   
 While the parties cannot rerun the course, and it is 
impossible to know exactly what steps the beneficiaries could or 
would have taken on the basis of that information, at a minimum 
they would have been able to attempt to negotiate with Frey for 
installation of a procedure to secure the funds.  Failing that, 
we believe that they could have sought equitable relief under 
ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) on behalf of the plan to the same end.  
Furthermore, we think it likely that a court would have 
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recognized that placing the fund assets in Frey's hands would 
have posed a threat to the interests of the beneficiaries and 
thus have granted relief.  In sum, therefore, we conclude that 
the Bank's breach of fiduciary duties led to Ream's loss and that 
the district court thus properly granted Ream summary judgment.  
Consequently, we will affirm its summary judgment. 
 We caution, however, that our opinion is limited in 
scope.  Certainly, a trustee may resign in accordance with the 
terms of a plan.  Moreover, we do not hold that a resigning 
trustee always must investigate a successor trustee.  Thus, this 
case probably would have been different if the Bank had turned 
the plan assets over to a reputable financial institution and the 
assets thereafter were converted.  We also recognize that we 
might have reached a different result if the Bank had made a full 
disclosure to the beneficiaries of the circumstances leading to 
its resignation before it resigned and the beneficiaries did not 
take steps to protect the plan assets.  Consequently, we 
emphasize that we affirm the district court because of the 
convergence of the circumstances in this case that led to Ream's 
loss.   
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the aforesaid, the order for summary 
judgment of April 1, 1996, will be affirmed.7 
                     
7.     The parties have treated the appeal as if it included an 
appeal from the damages judgment entered April 15, 1996.  Thus, 
we effectively are affirming that judgment. 
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